@tinkoff/mocker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.0.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 5.0.9 | 6 / 2 | |
| 5.0.8 | 6 / 2 | |
| 5.0.7 | 6 / 2 |
v7.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.