@tiptap/html
utility package to render tiptap JSON as HTML
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): gitHead dropped as part of CI/CD publish transition; benign for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legit move to GitHub Actions CI publish with SLSA attestation; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): v2 maintenance branch publish on an established, high-trust package; no payload change. | ai |
Versions (showing 99 of 99)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.29.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.29.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.28.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.27.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.27.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.27.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.27.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.27.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.26.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.26.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.25.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.24.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.23.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.23.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.23.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.23.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.23.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.22.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.22.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.22.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.22.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.22.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.22.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.21.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.20.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.19.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.18.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.17.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 3.17.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.16.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.15.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.15.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.15.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.15.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.14.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.13.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.12.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.12.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.11.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.11.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.10.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.9.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.9.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.8.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.7.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.7.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.7.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.6.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.5.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.5.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.5.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.5.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.4.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.3.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.3.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.2.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.2.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.2.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.9 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.27.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.27.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.27.0 | 1 / 2 |
v3.29.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.28.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.27.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.27.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.27.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.20.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.19.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.18.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.27.2
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (_bdbch) than the most recent previously approved version (tiptap-bot) on 2026-01-07, but _bdbch is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.27.1
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.