@titelmedia/eslint-config-es22
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:eslint-plugin-import | AI (phantom-deps): ESLint configs reference plugins by name in config objects, not via direct imports — stable false positive for this package type. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@titelmedia/eslint-config-es6 | AI (phantom-deps): Sibling org ESLint config extended by name in config, not imported directly — expected pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@titelmedia/linter-executables | AI (phantom-deps): Org-scoped tooling dep used at runtime/CLI level, not via direct import — expected for linter config packages. | ai |
v8.1.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (dazlious) than the most recent previously approved version (titelmedia-admin) on 2026-06-03, but dazlious is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.