@titelmedia/prettier-config
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal org config package; sparse metadata is expected for private tooling published publicly. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal config package; missing description is consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@titelmedia/linter-executables | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep used as a peer/runtime tool, not directly imported in source — stable false positive. | ai |
v8.1.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (dazlious) than the most recent previously approved version (titelmedia-admin) on 2026-06-03, but dazlious is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.