@tomo-inc/wallet-connect-protocol
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:siwe | AI (phantom-deps): SDK re-exports SIWE for wallet signing; phantom-dep is false positive for this pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:qrcode | AI (phantom-deps): SDK re-exports QR code generation; phantom-dep is false positive for this pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@walletconnect/types | AI (phantom-deps): SDK re-exports WalletConnect types; phantom-dep is false positive for this pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@walletconnect/utils | AI (phantom-deps): SDK re-exports WalletConnect utilities; phantom-dep is false positive for this pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@walletconnect/sign-client | AI (phantom-deps): SDK re-exports WalletConnect client; phantom-dep is false positive for this pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.19 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.18 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.17 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.16 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.15 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.14 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.13 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.11 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.10 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.9 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.8 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.7 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.6 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.5 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.4 | 5 / 7 |
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (tomo-pp) than the most recent previously approved version (hongbo_tomo) on 2026-05-27, but tomo-pp is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.