@toptal/picasso-tree-view
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is cosmetic given CI/CD publish with Sigstore attestation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Toptal migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD; SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate automated pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established Toptal monorepo component with SLSA provenance; inactivity gap is not indicative of takeover given CI/CD publishing and clean diff. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@toptal/picasso-utils | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@toptal/picasso-button | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@toptal/picasso-container | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.46 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.45 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.44 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.43 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.42 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.41 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.40 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.39 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.38 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.37 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.36 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.35 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.0.34 | 4 / 1 |
v3.0.46
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.