@toruslabs/broadcast-channel
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@toruslabs/eccrypto | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same torusresearch org; stable pattern across versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@toruslabs/metadata-helpers | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same torusresearch org; stable pattern across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 13.3.0 | 7 / 36 | |
| 13.2.0 | 7 / 36 | |
| 13.1.0 | 7 / 36 | |
| 13.0.1 | 8 / 36 | |
| 13.0.0 | 8 / 36 |
v13.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v13.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v13.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v13.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v13.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.