@totalreclaw/totalreclaw
End-to-end encrypted, agent-portable memory for OpenClaw and any LLM-agent runtime. XChaCha20-Poly1305 with protobuf v4 + on-chain Memory Taxonomy v1 (claim / preference / directive / commitment / episode / summary).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Long encoded strings are EVM bytecode constants from the viem library (e.g., multicall3Bytecode, deploylessCallViaBytecodeBytecode) — legitimate hex-encoded smart contract bytecodes, not malicious payloads. | ai |
v1.0.5
2 findingsModified file contains 7 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
2 findingsModified file contains 7 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.