@transitionsag/seeds
Headless SolidJS UI primitives built on zag-js.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for new/small packages; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.22 | 28 / 19 | |
| 0.0.21 | 26 / 19 | |
| 0.0.20 | 21 / 19 | |
| 0.0.19 | 21 / 19 | |
| 0.0.18 | 19 / 19 | |
| 0.0.17 | 19 / 19 | |
| 0.0.16 | 6 / 7 |
v0.0.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.