@treeship/core-wasm
WebAssembly bindings for Treeship cryptographic verification. Runs anywhere WASM runs: Node, browser, Vercel Edge, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish (zerker1) to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; expected and documented pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published via CI with Sigstore attestation; stable positive signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.2 | 0 / 0 |
v0.11.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.