@trustvc/w3c
A wrapper package to serve all packages within the TrustVC W3C: 1. [@trustvc/w3c-context](https://github.com/TrustVC/w3c/tree/main/packages/w3c-context) 2. [@trustvc/w3c-credential-status](https://github.com/TrustVC/w3c/tree/main/packages/w3c-credential-s
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established IMDA/TrustVC org package; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 0 |
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.