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@tryghost/bunyan-rotating-filestream

npm Repository
12
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

zimoatghostallouiskernalghostchrisraibleerisdsjohnonolankevinansfieldcobbspuraileencgnjlohminimaluminiumsam-lordpauladamdavisbobvaneckjoeegrigghadretjonhickmanerik-ghostsagzyvershwalzach1618mike182ukluissazevedolsingernickmoretonrenatoworksrblstr-ghostevanhahn-ghostaustin.burdineweylandswartghost-slimertmciescojonatan-ghost9larsons

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): Org-wide CI/CD migration explains maintainer list churn; provenance attestation confirms legitimacy. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Same org migration; not a takeover pattern given provenance. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by trusted-publisher migration, not suspicious activity. ai

Versions (showing 12 of 12)

Version Deps Published
0.0.12 1 / 2
0.0.11 1 / 2
0.0.10 1 / 2
0.0.9 1 / 2
0.0.8 1 / 2
0.0.7 1 / 7
0.0.6 1 / 7
0.0.5 1 / 7
0.0.4 1 / 7
0.0.3 1 / 7
0.0.2 0 / 7
0.0.1 0 / 6

v0.0.12

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.10

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.8

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: sam-lord → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-15, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sam-lord) on 2026-07-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.0.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.