@tryghost/config-url-helpers
`npm install @tryghost/config-url-helpers --save`
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): evanhahn-ghost is a Ghost Foundation team member; routine maintainer rotation for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): ibalosh removal paired with team addition is consistent with normal Ghost Foundation team changes. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.25 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.24 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.23 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.22 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.21 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.20 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.19 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.17 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.16 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.15 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.14 | 0 / 4 |
v1.0.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.17
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.16
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.