@tryghost/content-api
JavaScript Client Library for the Ghost [Content API](https://ghost.org/docs/content-api/)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms supply chain integrity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are ghost-org accounts consistent with org-level team rotation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal paired with org-level maintainer rotation; no malicious indicators present. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.12.7 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.12.6 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.12.5 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.12.4 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.12.3 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.12.2 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.12.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.11.28 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.11.27 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.11.26 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.11.25 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.11.24 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.11.23 | 1 / 17 |
v1.12.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.12.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.11.28
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.11.27
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.11.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.11.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.11.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.11.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.