@tryghost/kg-default-cards
`npm install @tryghost/kg-default-cards --save`
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Consistent with automated CI publishing transition, no other malicious signal. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Move to CI/CD-attested publishing (GitHub Actions), improvement not compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): CI-published with SLSA attestation intact; benign metadata gap. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Ghost Foundation package; provenance absence is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator here. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI publish; dormancy explained by org release cadence, not takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Ghost Foundation org package published via CI with SLSA attestation; maintainer additions are routine for this org. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established Ghost Foundation monorepo package; missing description is cosmetic. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped Ghost monorepo package; missing description/keywords are cosmetic, not spam indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:handlebars | AI (dependencies): handlebars 4.7.9 is the current stable release; well-known templating library with no active advisories at this version. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation publishes via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation; stable supply chain signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 36 of 36)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.3.5 | 7 / 0 | |
| 10.3.4 | 7 / 9 | |
| 10.3.3 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.3.2 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.3.1 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.3.0 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.2.13 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.2.12 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.2.11 | 7 / 13 | |
| 10.2.10 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.9 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.8 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.7 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.6 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.5 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.4 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.3 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.2 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.2.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.1.5 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.1.4 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.1.3 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.1.2 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.1.1 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.1.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.10 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.9 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.8 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.7 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.6 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.5 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.4 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.3 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.2 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.1 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.0.0 | 7 / 5 |
v10.3.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v10.3.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (allouis) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-01-19, but allouis is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.2.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (chrisraible) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-01-15, but chrisraible is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (daniellockyer) than the most recent previously approved version (kevinansfield) on 2025-02-17, but daniellockyer is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.0.10
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (kevinansfield) than the most recent previously approved version (ronaldlangeveld) on 2025-01-08, but kevinansfield is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.0.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (ronaldlangeveld) than the most recent previously approved version (kevinansfield) on 2024-08-14, but ronaldlangeveld is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (ronaldlangeveld) than the most recent previously approved version (kevinansfield) on 2024-06-19, but ronaldlangeveld is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.