@tryghost/kg-html-to-lexical
Convert HTML strings into Lexical editor state objects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Ghost Foundation internal maintainer rotation; kevinansfield is a long-standing trusted publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): kevinansfield is a long-standing Ghost Foundation publisher; transition from sanne-san is consistent with org-internal handoff. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Ghost Foundation monorepo package; dormancy reflects migration/restructuring, not suspicious activity. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped Ghost Foundation package; missing description is a cosmetic issue, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/kg-default-nodes | AI (dependencies): First-party Ghost monorepo dependency; expected for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/kg-default-transforms | AI (dependencies): First-party Ghost monorepo dependency; expected for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 41 of 41)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.2 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.3.1 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.3.0 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.45 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.44 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.43 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.42 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.41 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.40 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.39 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1.2.38 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.37 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.36 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.35 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.34 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.33 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.32 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.31 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.30 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.29 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.28 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.27 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.25 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.24 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.23 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.22 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.21 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.20 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.19 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.18 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.17 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.16 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.15 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.14 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.13 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.12 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.11 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.10 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.9 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.8 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.2.7 | 10 / 7 |
v1.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.43
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.42
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.41
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.40
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.35
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.34
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.33
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.32
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.31
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.30
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.