@tryghost/koenig-lexical

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-03, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-03-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-25, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-02-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (chrisraible) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-01-27, but chrisraible is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (kevinansfield) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-01-27, but kevinansfield is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (tmciesco) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-01-22, but tmciesco is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (chrisraible) than the most recent previously approved version (vershwal) on 2026-01-15, but chrisraible is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.