@tryghost/limit-service
This module is intended to hold **all of the logic** for testing if site: - would be over a given limit if they took an action (i.e. added one more thing, switched to a different limit) - if they are over a limit already - consistent error messages explai
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): erisds is an established Ghost Foundation publisher; transition from daniellockyer is consistent with org-internal handoff. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/errors | AI (dependencies): First-party Ghost Foundation dependency; same org as the package itself, stable across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.5.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.4.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.4.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.4.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.4.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.4.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.3.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.3.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.3.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.2.19 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.2.18 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.2.17 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.2.16 | 3 / 4 |
v1.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.