@tryghost/mg-chorus
Export content from Chorus using their exports, and generate a `zip` file you can import into a Ghost installation.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Low-traffic utility in a maintained monorepo; dormancy reflects infrequent need, not takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation provides stronger commit linkage than gitHead field; absence is benign here. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation via Sigstore confirms CI/CD publish integrity for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms supply chain integrity. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped package with clear purpose; missing description is cosmetic for established org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent with publisher's prior releases; provenance adoption is sparse across npm. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@tryghost/errors | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dependency; same-org scope pattern is stable for Ghost packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/debug | AI (dependencies): Internal Ghost Foundation dependency; stable pattern across all @tryghost/* packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/mg-fs-utils | AI (dependencies): Internal Ghost Foundation monorepo dependency; stable pattern across all @tryghost/mg-* packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.8.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.8.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.8.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.8.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.7.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.6.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.4.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.30 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.29 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.28 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.27 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.26 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.25 | 3 / 3 |
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.