@tryghost/mg-fs-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is a minor metadata gap, not a supply chain risk for this org-published package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects publisher account transition, not abandonment; 102 versions and active ecosystem use confirm legitimacy. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/zip | AI (dependencies): First-party Ghost Foundation package; consistent with the rest of the @tryghost/* dependency set. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Ghost Foundation package; lack of provenance is consistent across their releases. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Ghost monorepo package; missing description is a consistent style choice, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sharp | AI (phantom-deps): sharp is explicitly declared as a runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep is a false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.25.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.24.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.23.3 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.23.2 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.23.1 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.23.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.22.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.21.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.20.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.19.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.18.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.17.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.16.7 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.16.6 | 11 / 2 | |
| 0.16.5 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.16.4 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.16.3 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.16.2 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.16.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.16.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.15.7 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.15.6 | 11 / 3 |
v0.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.