@tryghost/mg-medium-export
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): TryGhost migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate supply chain. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is a minor metadata gap, not a supply chain risk for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Ghost Foundation monorepo; irregular publish cadence is normal for migration utility packages with low download volume. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tryghost/debug | AI (dependencies): First-party Ghost Foundation package; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation monorepo package; provenance not used across their npm publishing pipeline. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.26.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.25.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.24.3 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.24.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.24.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.24.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.23.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.22.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.21.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.20.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.19.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.18.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.17.29 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.17.28 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.17.27 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.26 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.25 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.24 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.23 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.22 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.21 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.20 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.17.19 | 6 / 3 |
v0.26.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.25.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.22.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.17.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.17.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.17.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.