@tryghost/nql
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): lodash is a canonical utility library; addition is benign for this Ghost Foundation package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @tryghost package; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive with no brand impersonation. | ai |
v0.12.11
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jonatan-ghost) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisraible) on 2026-05-29, but jonatan-ghost is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.12.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.