@tryghost/referrer-parser
Simple library for parsing referrer URLs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): rblstr-ghost is an established Ghost Foundation publisher with 38 approved packages; transition appears legitimate. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.18 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.1.17 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.1.16 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.15 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.14 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.13 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.12 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.11 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.10 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.8 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.7 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 13 |
v0.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.6
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.4
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.