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@tryghost/social-urls

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`npm install @tryghost/social-urls --save`

15
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

zimoatghostallouiskernalghostchrisraibleerisdsjohnonolankevinansfieldcobbspuraileencgnjlohminimaluminiumsam-lordpauladamdavisbobvaneckjoeegrigghadretjonhickmanerik-ghostsagzyvershwalmike182ukluissazevedolsingernickmoretonrenatoworksrblstr-ghostevanhahn-ghostweylandswartghost-slimertmciescojonatan-ghost9larsons

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): erisds is an established Ghost Foundation publisher; change reflects internal org rotation, not compromise. ai

Versions (showing 15 of 15)

Version Deps Published
0.1.62 0 / 4
0.1.61 0 / 4
0.1.60 0 / 4
0.1.59 0 / 4
0.1.58 0 / 4
0.1.57 0 / 4
0.1.56 0 / 4
0.1.54 0 / 4
0.1.53 0 / 4
0.1.52 0 / 4
0.1.51 0 / 4
0.1.50 0 / 4
0.1.49 0 / 4
0.1.48 0 / 4
0.1.47 0 / 4

v0.1.62

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.60

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vershwal → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.59

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vershwal → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.58

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vershwal → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.57

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vershwal → rblstr-ghost (on 2026-01-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.56

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.54

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: daniellockyer → kevinansfield (on 2025-07-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.53

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: daniellockyer → sagzy (on 2025-07-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.52

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: daniellockyer → tmciesco (on 2025-07-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.51

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: daniellockyer → 9larsons (on 2025-06-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.50

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: daniellockyer → erisds (on 2025-05-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.49

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.48

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.47

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.