@tryghost/string
`npm install @tryghost/string --save`
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are Ghost org accounts (rblstr-ghost, evanhahn-ghost, weylandswart); consistent with org-level team rotation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of ibalosh alongside Ghost org account additions is consistent with routine team rotation, not a takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Ghost Foundation migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Ghost Foundation package; lack of Sigstore provenance is a process gap, not a security signal for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:stripe | AI (typosquat): Legitimate Ghost Foundation scoped package; Levenshtein match to 'stripe' is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.3.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.3.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.21 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.20 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.19 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.17 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.16 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.15 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.14 | 1 / 5 |
v0.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.17
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.16
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.