@trystero-p2p/supabase
Supabase strategy for Trystero
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Absence of provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present to elevate this. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.25.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.24.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.0 | 2 / 1 |
v0.25.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.