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@tscircuit/capacity-autorouter

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Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

seveibar

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata url-dep:dataset-srj18 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; tscircuit org repo matching publisher identity; same pattern as other accepted URL deps in this package. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; tscircuit org repo matching publisher identity; same pattern as other accepted URL deps in this package. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts AI (npm-metadata): devDependency SHA-pinned to tscircuit org's own repo; same pattern as all other accepted url-deps in this package. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:high-density-repair01 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test fixture from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:high-density-repair03 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test fixture from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:dataset-srj11-45-degree AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test dataset from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tscircuit/dataset-srj05 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test dataset from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:high-density-dataset-z04 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test dataset from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj12-bus-routing AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test dataset from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tscircuit/rectdiff AI (npm-metadata): devDependency from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:pcb-poly-hyper-graph AI (npm-metadata): devDependency from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:tiny-hypergraph-poly AI (npm-metadata): devDependency from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:high-density-repair02 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tscircuit/fixed-via-hypergraph-solver AI (npm-metadata): devDependency from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@tsci/seveibar.dataset-srj13 AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test dataset from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:zdwiel-dataset AI (npm-metadata): devDependency benchmark dataset pinned by SHA; not shipped to consumers. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:tiny-hypergraph AI (npm-metadata): devDependency test fixture from tscircuit org; not shipped to consumers. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:bun-match-svg AI (phantom-deps): Likely used in test/build scripts referenced via config rather than direct import; stable FP. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:fast-json-stable-stringify AI (phantom-deps): Listed as a runtime dep in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:object-hash AI (phantom-deps): Listed as a runtime dep in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. ai

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v0.0.570

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.569

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.568

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.567

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.566

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.565

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.564

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.563

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.562

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.561

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.560

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.557

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.556

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.555

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.554

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.553

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.552

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.551

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.550

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.549

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.548

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#48cd2f8f651bc9213a339580fdf125d2a1dd9254' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.547

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#de0a8db80288715382857da7d5558096ca786cb6' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.546

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#de0a8db80288715382857da7d5558096ca786cb6' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.545

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#de0a8db80288715382857da7d5558096ca786cb6' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.544

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#de0a8db80288715382857da7d5558096ca786cb6' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.543

4 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): dataset-srj18 npm-metadata

Dependency 'dataset-srj18' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj18.git#de0a8db80288715382857da7d5558096ca786cb6' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.542

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01 npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/autorouting-dataset-01.git#f9c0a8fe11e9bc05064bdafdf61f33eb38fa2b8e' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.541

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.540

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.539

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.538

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.537

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.536

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts npm-metadata

Dependency '@tsci/tscircuit.dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/dataset-srj16-bga-breakouts.git#e8b2e70e1f50a0dba3ad977e140766f53b9b75fb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.535

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.534

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.533

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.532

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.531

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.530

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.529

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.528

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.527

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.523

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.522

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.521

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.520

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.519

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.518

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.517

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.516

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.515

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.