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@tscircuit/checks

npm
51
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

seveibar

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata url-dep:@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned dep is in devDependencies only; not shipped to consumers. Stable pattern for this package. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 95)

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Version Deps Published
0.0.137 0 / 13
0.0.136 0 / 13
0.0.135 0 / 13
0.0.134 0 / 13
0.0.133 0 / 13
0.0.132 0 / 13
0.0.131 0 / 13
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v0.0.137

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.136

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.135

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.134

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.133

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.132

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.131

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.130

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.129

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.128

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.127

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.126

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.