@tscircuit/eval — Greenflagged

Evaluate code in a full tscircuit runtime environment, including Sucrase transpilation and execution, so you just need to send the code to be executed with automatic handling of imports from `@tsci/*`

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

seveibar

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
npm-metadata	url-dep:@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs	AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned devDependency only; not shipped to consumers, and SHA pinning is actually more secure than semver.	ai	2026/05/30
source-diff	encoded-string-file:dist/webworker/entrypoint.js	AI (source-diff): Minified bundled SVG/chart code in webworker entrypoint; not an obfuscated payload, stable pattern for this package.	ai	2026/05/18
install-scripts	install-script:postinstall	AI (install-scripts): Postinstall runs a local version-copy script and bun install --ignore-scripts; no external fetch or malicious behavior.	ai	2026/04/28
source-diff	encoded-string-file:dist/blob-url.js	AI (source-diff): dist/blob-url.js is intentionally built by build:blob-url script to embed a Web Worker as a base64 blob URL. The encoded content is standard ESM bundler boilerplate, not a malicious payload. Stable pattern for this package.	ai	2026/04/26

Versions (showing 51 of 732)

View all versions

Version	Deps	Published
0.0.902	0 / 76	2026-06-07
0.0.901	0 / 76	2026-06-06
0.0.900	0 / 76	2026-06-05
0.0.899	0 / 76	2026-06-05
0.0.898	0 / 76	2026-06-04
0.0.897	0 / 76	2026-06-04
0.0.896	0 / 76	2026-06-04
0.0.895	0 / 76	2026-06-04
0.0.894	0 / 76	2026-06-04
0.0.893	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.892	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.891	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.890	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.889	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.888	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.887	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.886	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.885	0 / 76	2026-06-03
0.0.884	0 / 76	2026-06-02
0.0.883	0 / 76	2026-06-02
0.0.882	0 / 76	2026-06-02
0.0.881	0 / 76	2026-06-02
0.0.880	0 / 76	2026-06-02
0.0.879	0 / 76	2026-06-01
0.0.878	0 / 76	2026-05-31
0.0.877	0 / 76	2026-05-31
0.0.876	0 / 76	2026-05-31
0.0.875	0 / 76	2026-05-31
0.0.874	0 / 75	2026-05-31
0.0.873	0 / 75	2026-05-29
0.0.871	0 / 74	2026-05-29
0.0.870	0 / 74	2026-05-28
0.0.869	0 / 74	2026-05-28
0.0.868	0 / 74	2026-05-27
0.0.867	0 / 74	2026-05-25
0.0.866	0 / 74	2026-05-25
0.0.865	0 / 74	2026-05-23
0.0.864	0 / 74	2026-05-22
0.0.863	0 / 74	2026-05-22
0.0.862	0 / 74	2026-05-22
0.0.861	0 / 74	2026-05-22
0.0.860	0 / 74	2026-05-21
0.0.859	0 / 74	2026-05-21
0.0.858	0 / 74	2026-05-21
0.0.857	0 / 74	2026-05-21
0.0.856	0 / 74	2026-05-21
0.0.855	0 / 74	2026-05-19
0.0.854	0 / 74	2026-05-19
0.0.853	0 / 74	2026-05-18
0.0.852	0 / 74	2026-05-17
0.0.851	0 / 74	2026-05-15

v0.0.902

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.901

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.900

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.899

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.898

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.897

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.896

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.895

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.894

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.893

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.892

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.891

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.890

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.889

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.888

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.887

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.886

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.885

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.884

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.883

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.882

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.881

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.880

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.879

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.878

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.877

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.876

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.875

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.874

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.873

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.871

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.870

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.869

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.868

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.867

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.866

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.865

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.864

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.863

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.862

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.861

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.860

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.859

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.858

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.857

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.856

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.855

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.854

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.853

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.852

2 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.851

3 findings

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs npm-metadata

Dependency '@tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tscircuit/jlcpcb-manufacturing-specs.git#e08af159db01a37db007e33f0a7268d0e4a279a5' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH Long encoded string in modified file: dist/webworker/entrypoint.js source-diff

Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.