@tscircuit/internal-dynamic-import
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Established tscircuit org publisher; 0.0.0 is a common initial version pattern for this ecosystem, not a malware indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 19 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 19 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 19 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 19 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 19 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 19 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 19 |
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.