@tscircuit/krt-wasm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:pkg-node/grid_router.js | AI (source-diff): Inline base64 WASM binary is standard wasm-pack/wasm-bindgen output; not a malicious payload. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): wasm-bindgen generated glue code; Reflect.get is standard JS/Wasm interop pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): wasm-bindgen standard pattern for embedding .wasm binary as base64 in JS glue file. | ai |
v0.1.4
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.