@tsgonest/cli-darwin-arm64
tsgonest binary for macOS ARM64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific CLI binary package; bundled binary is the entire purpose of this package, confirmed by SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.14.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.