@tsgonest/cli-win32-arm64
tsgonest binary for Windows ARM64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific CLI binary package; shipping a .exe is the entire purpose of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with CI/CD automation; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation provides stronger commit linkage than gitHead; absence is expected in this CI publish flow. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.14.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.15.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.5
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.2
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.1
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.3
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.2
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.1
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.2
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.1
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/tsgonest.exe
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.