@tsonic/csharp-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@tsonic/csharp-emitter | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; declared as runtime dependency but re-exported rather than directly imported — stable FP for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.83 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.82 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.81 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.80 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.79 | 2 / 5 |
v0.0.83
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.82
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.81
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.80
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.79
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.