@tsparticles/basic
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file-transition:tsparticles.basic.bundle.min.js | AI (source-diff): minified webpack bundle; benign build output | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): standard globalThis polyfill in webpack runtime | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): per-chunk browser dist bundles from legit build | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file-transition:tsparticles.basic.bundle.js | AI (source-diff): webpack eval-devtool bundle module loader, not net+exec malware | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file-transition:tsparticles.basic.bundle.js | AI (source-diff): webpack minified bundle, not obfuscation | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Same-org deps replacing removed ones in a major version bump; internal refactor. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher moved to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; legitimate automation transition. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/plugin-hex-color | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/plugin-hsl-color | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): eval calls are webpack devtool bundle artifacts, not dynamic user input; stable pattern across all tsparticles bundle packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/updater-out-modes | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/plugin-rgb-color | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/engine | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/move-base | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/shape-circle | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/updater-size | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/updater-color | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tsparticles/updater-opacity | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same tsparticles monorepo and publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.2 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.3.1 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.2.1 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.2.0 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.1.3 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.1.2 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.1.1 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.0.5 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.0.4 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.0.3 | 11 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 10 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 10 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.9.1 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.9.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.7.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.4.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.0.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 7 / 0 |
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.1
20 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
This file was readable in the previously greenflagged version and is now minified or obfuscated (lines over 3000 chars). A file that gains obfuscation between releases is a strong payload-swap indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
This file did not combine network calls with dynamic code execution in the previously greenflagged version, and now does. Gaining both halves in an existing file is a hallmark of a dropper/loader introduced by an update. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
This file did not combine network calls with dynamic code execution in the previously greenflagged version, and now does. Gaining both halves in an existing file is a hallmark of a dropper/loader introduced by an update.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.