@tsparticles/interaction-particles-collisions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist_browser_Collider_js.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack eval-devtool bundler output, not obfuscation/dropper; stable for this build. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Standard globalThis polyfill (new Function('return this')) from webpack runtime. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; canonical repo confirmed. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Major version bump (v3→v4) with multi-format output (browser/cjs/esm); expected file count increase. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): eval() calls are webpack devtool eval-source-map bundle artifacts, not dynamic code execution; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.3.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.9.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.8.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.7.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.7.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 0 |
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matteobruni.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.3.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — minified bundler output, not obfuscation on its own.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.