@ttt-productions/media-viewer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Intra-org dep swap (media-contracts → media-schemas); not a third-party injection. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped org package with clear naming; missing description is cosmetic, not a malware indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.10.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.10.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.10.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.10.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.10.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.10.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.13 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.12 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.11 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 1 |
v0.10.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (pignuggetz) on 2026-07-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.