@ttt-productions/query-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 46 of 46)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.14.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.14.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.8 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.7 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.6 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.5 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.4 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.6 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.5 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.4 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.15 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.14 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.13 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.12 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.11 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.10 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.9 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.8 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.7 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.6 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.5 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.4 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.1.30 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.1.29 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.1.28 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.1.27 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.1.26 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 6 |
v0.14.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (pignuggetz) on 2026-07-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.14.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (pignuggetz) on 2026-07-07, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.