@turbo/linux-arm64
The linux-arm64 binary for turbo, a monorepo build system.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package's entire purpose is distributing the turbo native binary; expected across all versions. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Turbo uses 0.0.0 as a placeholder version for platform binary packages; stable pattern across all 134 versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform binary shim for turborepo; no deps/tiny payload/sparse README are structural, not spam indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.10.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.8.21 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.8.20 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.8.19 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.8.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v2.10.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • turbo-linux-arm64/bin/turbo
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.19
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (turbobot) on 2026-03-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.8.18
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (turbobot) on 2026-03-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.