@turbo/workspaces
Tools for working with package managers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-C2pzdHW1.js | AI (source-diff): Minified tsdown bundle output; content matches declared deps, no obfuscation indicators beyond minification. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-C5maMirZ.mjs | AI (source-diff): Same as CJS counterpart; ESM bundle of the same legitimate code. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-C2pzdHW1.js | AI (source-diff): Network usage is update-check (version check); no dynamic code execution pattern visible in samples. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-C5maMirZ.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of the same tsdown bundle; same rationale as CJS counterpart. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-tgaQ3xBy.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown/rollup minified bundle output; imports match declared deps. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-D4C-1Ajd.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM variant; network/exec from bundled update-check/execa, not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-D4C-1Ajd.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of the same tsdown bundle; same benign pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-tgaQ3xBy.js | AI (source-diff): Network/exec pattern is from bundled update-check and execa deps, not malicious dropper. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-DMWl-kFW.mjs | AI (source-diff): Network/exec patterns are from bundled deps (execa, update-check) in normal build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-DMWl-kFW.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown/rollup minified ESM bundle; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-C2QjcU-1.js | AI (source-diff): Network/exec patterns are from bundled deps (execa, update-check) in normal build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-C2QjcU-1.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown/rollup minified bundle output; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-DZTyk3Od.js | AI (source-diff): Network/exec pattern is from bundled execa/update-check deps, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-9DAWjfTd.mjs | AI (source-diff): Network/exec pattern is from bundled execa/update-check deps, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-9DAWjfTd.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown ESM bundle output; same legitimate dep set. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-DZTyk3Od.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown bundle output; all imports are declared legitimate deps. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-K_QAsCNE.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are update-check; code execution is execa for package manager commands — both declared deps, expected behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-K_QAsCNE.js | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown/rollup bundle output; all imports are declared deps, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/convert-CPHQWSyu.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of the same bundle; same analysis applies. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/convert-CPHQWSyu.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of the same bundle; same analysis applies. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-2WSM2AFM.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard tsup/esbuild bundle; network calls come from bundled deps (update-check, execa) — not malicious dropper behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-6E4Q5G24.mjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled tsup/esbuild output for a CLI tool; dynamic require and network calls are part of the package's legitimate update-check and package-manager detection functionality. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-Y2U4B22G.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard tsup/esbuild bundle output; code sample shows typical module boilerplate, not dropper malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundle output from tsup; encoded strings are standard build artifacts for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/cli.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundle output from tsup; encoded strings are standard build artifacts for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase consistent with new chunk file added in build refactor; SLSA provenance confirms CI/CD build integrity. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Vercel turborepo migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fs-extra | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:js-yaml | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:semver | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ora | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:execa | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@inquirer/prompts | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:gradient-string | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:update-check | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:picocolors | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fast-glob | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool; dependencies used via config or indirect imports, not direct require/import. | ai |
Versions (showing 39 of 39)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.9.16 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.15 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.14 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.12 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.11 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.10 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.9 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.8 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.7 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.6 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.5 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.4 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.3 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.2 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.1 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.9.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.21 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.20 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.19 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.18 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.17 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.16 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.4 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.8.1 | 11 / 14 | |
| 2.8.0 | 11 / 14 | |
| 2.7.6 | 11 / 14 | |
| 2.7.5 | 11 / 14 | |
| 2.7.4 | 11 / 14 | |
| 2.7.3 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.7.2 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.6.3 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.6.2 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.6.1 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.5.8 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.5.7 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.5.6 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.5.5 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.5.4 | 11 / 15 | |
| 2.5.3 | 11 / 15 |
v2.9.16
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.15
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.14
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.12
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.11
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.10
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.3
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.2
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.1
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.0
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.21
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.20
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.19
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.18
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.17
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.16
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.4
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.1
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.0
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.6
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.5
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.4
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.5.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.