@turnkey/solana
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @turnkey/core is a first-party Turnkey SDK package from the same monorepo; not a suspicious third-party dep. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer list change reflects org-level CI migration, not a takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; consistent with CI/CD automation for the tkhq/sdk monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects SDK versioning cadence; SLSA attestation and org continuity confirm legitimate publish. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 51)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.30 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.29 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.28 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.27 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.26 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.25 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.24 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.23 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.22 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.21 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.20 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.19 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.18 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.17 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.16 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.15 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.14 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.13 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.12 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.11 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.10 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.0.43 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.42 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.41 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.40 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.39 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.38 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.37 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.36 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.35 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.34 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.33 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.32 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.31 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.30 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.29 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.28 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.27 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.26 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.25 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.24 | 4 / 3 |
v1.1.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.12
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.11
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.10
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andrewtk) than the most recent previously approved version (r-n-o) on 2025-10-29, but andrewtk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andrewtk) than the most recent previously approved version (r-n-o) on 2025-09-10, but andrewtk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.41
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.40
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.35
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.34
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.33
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.32
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.31
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.30
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-05-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.