← Home

@turnkey/wallet-stamper

npm Repository Homepage
25
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

andrewtkr-n-ojack-kearney-tkhq

Keywords

Turnkeyhttpstamperwallet authentication

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Turnkey migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA attestation; expected for this org's monorepo. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer list change reflects org-wide shift to automated publishing; consistent with SLSA-attested CI/CD workflow. ai

Versions (showing 25 of 25)

Version Deps Published
1.1.18 2 / 7
1.1.17 2 / 7
1.1.16 2 / 7
1.1.15 2 / 7
1.1.14 2 / 7
1.1.13 2 / 7
1.1.12 2 / 7
1.1.11 2 / 7
1.1.10 2 / 7
1.1.9 2 / 7
1.1.8 2 / 7
1.1.7 2 / 7
1.1.6 2 / 7
1.1.5 3 / 7
1.1.4 3 / 7
1.1.3 3 / 7
1.1.2 3 / 7
1.1.1 3 / 7
1.1.0 2 / 7
1.0.9 3 / 7
1.0.8 3 / 7
1.0.7 3 / 7
1.0.6 3 / 7
1.0.5 3 / 7
1.0.4 3 / 7

v1.1.18

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.17

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.16

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.15

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.14

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.12

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-30) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2025-11-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: moe-dev → GitHub Actions (on 2025-11-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.6

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: r-n-o → andrewtk (on 2025-10-29) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.1.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.1

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: andrewtk → r-n-o (on 2025-09-20) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.1.0

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: r-n-o → andrewtk (on 2025-09-10) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.0.9

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.8

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.6

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: moe-dev → r-n-o (on 2025-06-30) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.0.5

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: moe-dev → bcturnkey (on 2025-06-27) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.