@tursodatabase/database
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance is the expected pattern for this napi-rs project. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal aligns with automated CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms supply chain integrity. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Used only for musl detection via ldd --version; standard napi-rs binary loader pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-execsync | AI (semgrep): Hardcoded ldd --version call for musl detection; no user-controlled input. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): NAPI_RS_NATIVE_LIBRARY_PATH env var override is a documented napi-rs escape hatch for custom binary paths. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.5.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.5.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.3.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 5 |
v0.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.