@twinfinity/permission
Twinfinity Permission Service client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:docs/assets/hierarchy.js | AI (source-diff): TypeDoc-generated navigation index; base64/deflate data assigned to window.hierarchyData is standard docs output. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:docs/assets/navigation.js | AI (source-diff): TypeDoc-generated navigation index; base64/deflate data assigned to window.navigationData is standard docs output. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:docs/assets/search.js | AI (source-diff): TypeDoc-generated search index; base64/deflate data assigned to window.searchData is standard docs output. | ai |
v6.0.1
4 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.