@twurple/eventsub-ws
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@twurple/auth | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on indirect usage patterns common in monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.1.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.1.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.1.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.0.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.0.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.0.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0 | 8 / 1 |
v8.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.