@typemove/iota
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Part of same CI/CD migration, provenance-verified. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Old account removed as part of legitimate CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Explained by move to trusted CI/CD publisher with Sigstore provenance, not a compromise. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:koa | AI (typosquat): Scoped @typemove/iota is an IOTA blockchain SDK binding, not a typosquat of koa. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:radash | AI (phantom-deps): radash is a declared dep used in codegen/config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:got | AI (typosquat): Scoped @typemove/iota is an IOTA blockchain SDK binding, not a typosquat of got. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:prettier | AI (phantom-deps): prettier is a declared dep used in codegen/config; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
v2.0.6
3 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (maintainer-change): Full maintainer replacement with source wipe is a strong hijack indicator; generalizes until original maintainer is restored.) All previous maintainers (zfy0701) were replaced by new maintainers (philz3906). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (zfy0701) on 2026-07-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.