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@types/mathjax

npm Repository Homepage
14
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

types

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
email-domain unclaimed-email:https://github.com/rolandzwaga AI (email-domain): The 'email' field is a GitHub profile URL, not an email address. The analyzer is misinterpreting the URL as an email domain — no real hijack risk exists. ai

Versions (showing 14 of 14)

Version Deps Published
0.0.40 0 / 0
0.0.39 0 / 0
0.0.38 0 / 0
0.0.37 0 / 0
0.0.36 0 / 0
0.0.35 0 / 0
0.0.34 0 / 0
0.0.33 0 / 0
0.0.32 0 / 0
0.0.31 0 / 0
0.0.30 0 / 0
0.0.29 0 / 0
0.0.28 0 / 0
0.0.27 0 / 0

v0.0.40

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.39

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.38

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.37

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.36

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.35

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.34

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.33

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.32

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.31

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.30

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.29

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.28

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.27

2 findings
HIGH Unclaimed maintainer email domain: https://github.com/rolandzwaga email-domain

Maintainer email 'https://github.com/rolandzwaga' uses domain 'https://github.com/rolandzwaga' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.