@uiw/codemirror-extensions-langs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Moved to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Inlined official @codemirror/lang-* deps previously bundled via @codemirror/language-data. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:codemirror-lang-mermaid | AI (dependencies): Community CodeMirror 6 language extension for Mermaid diagrams; expected dependency for a language loader package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@nextjournal/lang-clojure | AI (dependencies): Nextjournal's CodeMirror 6 Clojure language extension; legitimate third-party language plugin. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@replit/codemirror-lang-nix | AI (dependencies): Replit's CodeMirror 6 Nix language extension; published by a well-known company. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package from a known publisher with 131 approved packages and 8+ year history; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@replit/codemirror-lang-svelte | AI (dependencies): Replit's CodeMirror 6 Svelte language extension; published by a well-known company. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@replit/codemirror-lang-solidity | AI (dependencies): Replit's CodeMirror 6 Solidity language extension; published by a well-known company. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@replit/codemirror-lang-csharp | AI (dependencies): Replit's CodeMirror 6 C# language extension; published by a well-known company. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@codemirror/lang-lezer | AI (dependencies): Official @codemirror scope language extension; legitimate dependency for a CodeMirror language loader package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 104)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.25.11 | 26 / 4 | |
| 4.25.10 | 26 / 4 | |
| 4.25.9 | 26 / 4 | |
| 4.25.8 | 26 / 4 | |
| 4.25.7 | 26 / 4 | |
| 4.25.6 | 26 / 4 | |
| 4.25.5 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.25.4 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.25.3 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.25.2 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.25.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.25.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.24.2 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.24.1 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.24.0 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.14 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.13 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.12 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.11 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.10 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.9 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.8 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.7 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.6 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.5 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.4 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.3 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.2 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.1 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.23.0 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.22.2 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.22.1 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.22.0 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.21.25 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.21.24 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.21.23 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.21.22 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.21.21 | 27 / 0 | |
| 4.21.20 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.19 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.18 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.17 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.16 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.15 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.14 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.13 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.12 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.11 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.10 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.9 | 26 / 0 | |
| 4.21.8 | 26 / 0 |
v4.25.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.23.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.22.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.22.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.21.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.21.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.