@umbraco-cms/backoffice
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 17.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.3.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.3.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.3.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.3.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 17.3.1 | 0 / 0 |
v17.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.