@umijs/bundler-vite
@umijs/bundler-vite
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Long-lived UmiJS monorepo package; version bump with no material changes, consistent with normal release cadence resumption. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse metadata is typical for internal monorepo packages; package has 531 versions and legitimate ecosystem use. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@umijs/utils | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the UmiJS monorepo, versioned in lockstep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@umijs/bundler-utils | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the UmiJS monorepo, versioned in lockstep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:less | AI (phantom-deps): less is an externalized compiled dep per compiledConfig; not directly imported but legitimately declared. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known implicit runtime polyfill dependency for bundlers; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Fires inside compiled/vendored @vitejs/plugin-legacy bundle; expected pattern for a bundler package that vendors deps. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 196)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.6.82 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.81 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.80 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.79 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.78 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.77 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.76 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.69 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.68 | 11 / 5 | |
| 4.6.67 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.66 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.65 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.64 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.63 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.62 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.61 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.59 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.58 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.57 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.56 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.55 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.54 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.53 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.52 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.51 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.50 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.49 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.48 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.47 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.46 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.45 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.44 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.43 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.42 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.41 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.40 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.39 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.38 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.37 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.36 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.35 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.34 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.33 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.32 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.31 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.30 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.29 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.28 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.27 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.26 | 10 / 5 | |
| 4.6.25 | 10 / 5 |
v4.6.82
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.81
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.80
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.79
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.78
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.77
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.76
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (zoomdong07) on 2026-07-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.6.69
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.